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On Two RFID Privacy Notions and Their Relations
YINGJIU LI, ROBERT H. DENG, and JUNZUO LAI, Singapore Management University
CHANGSHE MA, South China Normal University
Privacy of RFID systems is receiving increasing attention in the RFID community. Basically, there are two
kinds of RFID privacy notions in the literature: one based on the indistinguishability of two tags, denoted as
ind-privacy, and the other based on the unpredictability of the output of an RFID protocol, denoted as unp-
privacy. In this article, we first revisit the existing unpredictability-based RFID privacy models and point
out their limitations. We then propose a new RFID privacy model, denoted as unp-privacy, based on the
indistinguishability of a real tag and a virtual tag. We formally clarify its relationship with the ind-privacy
model. It is proven that ind-privacy is weaker than unp-privacy. Moreover, the minimal (necessary and
sufficient) condition on RFID tags to achieve unp-privacy is determined. It is shown that if an RFID system
is unp-private, then the computational power of an RFID tag can be used to construct a pseudorandom
function family provided that the RFID system is complete and sound. On the other hand, if each tag is
able to compute a pseudorandom function, then the tags can be used to construct an RFID system with
unp-privacy. In this sense, a pseudorandom function family is the minimal requirement on an RFID tag’s
computational power for enforcing RFID system privacy. Finally, a new RFIDmutual authentication protocol
is proposed to satisfy the minimal requirement.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: C.2.0 [General]: Security and protection; D.4.6 [Operating Systems]:
Security and protection—Cryptographic controls
General Terms: Security, Design
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1. INTRODUCTION
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) has been widely envisioned as an inevitable
replacement of barcodes and other consumer labeling techniques for automatic object
identification. An RFID system consists of small devices called RFID tags, one or more
RFID readers and a back-end database. Unlike barcodes, each RFID tag records a suf-
ficiently long bitstring to uniquely identify the tag or its bearer. Readers communicate
with tags using RF signals at a distance from a few inches to several feet. Since RF
signals are invisible and penetrating, RFID systems provide a perfect environment for
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attackers. The prevalence of RFID technologies introduces various serious risks and
poses unique security concerns [Juels 2006; Peris-Lopez et al. 2006].
Security problems in RFID systems can be classified into two types. The first is
concerned with attacks that aim to wipe out the functioning of the system. The second
type, the one that interests us here, is related to privacy. In particular, unauthorized
tracking of RFID system users and RFID tag bearers via clandestine scanning, where
an adversary uses an unauthorized reader collecting RF waves to track the movement
of RFID tags, has been recognized as one of the most imperative privacy concerns in
the deployments of RFID systems. A privacy-preserving RFID system should therefore
provide anonymity (i.e., hiding of a tag’s identity) as well as unlinkability of the proto-
col transcripts of a tag. Much effort [Ateniese et al. 2005; Avoine et al. 2005; Garfinkel
et al. 2005; Juels et al. 2008; Juels et al. 2003; Molnar and Wagner 2004; Spiekermann
and Evdokimov 2009] has been made to address the privacy issues in RFID systems,
mostly focused on two aspects: one is to construct RFID protocols [Ohkubo et al.
2004; Tsudik 2006; Peris-Lopez et al. 2006; Tsudik 2007] that are compatible with the
constraints of tags; the other is to formalize privacy models for RFID systems. In the
former aspect, dozens of protocols have been proposed in the literature, while many of
them are reported to have privacy flaws. In the latter aspect, two major RFID privacy
notions have been proposed: one based on the indistinguishability of two tags [Juels
and Weis 2007], denoted as ind-privacy, and the other based on the unpredictability
of the output of an RFID protocol [Ha et al. 2008], denoted as unp-privacy. In this
article, we closely examine the two types of privacy notions, explain why many
existing protocols have privacy flaws, and construct an efficient privacy-preserving
protocol.
One fundamental problem we investigate is to find a reasonable RFID privacy notion
that is easy to work with. In addition, to understand which level of privacy an RFID
system provides, it is critical to clarify the relationships among different RFID privacy
notions.
The other problem we investigate regards the minimal cryptographic function that
needs to be supported in tags in order to guarantee the privacy of RFID systems. A
definite answer to this problem will help design low-cost tags for RFID systems with
privacy. It will also help explain why many existing RFID protocols that do not support
the minimal cryptographic function have privacy flaws.
1.1. Our Contributions
In this article, we address the above two basic problems for RFID privacy and make
the following contributions.
(1) We revisit the existing unpredictability-based RFID privacy models, unp-privacy
for short, which is the first unpredictability-based RFID privacy model proposed by
Ha et al. [2008]. We point out the limitations of the unp-privacy model and propose
a new privacy model, denoted as unp-privacy, based on the indistinguishability of
a real tag and a virtual tag.
The underlying intuition of the unp-privacy model is that the output of a tag
looks random. Informally, for an unp-private RFID protocol, it requires that every
probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary not be able to distinguish the output
of a tag from a random value. However, van Deursen and Radomirovic´ [2009]
showed that an adversary can trace a tag by observing the output of the reader and
break the privacy of a RFID protocol which is proved unp-private.
To rectify the deficiency of the unp-privacy model, Ma et al. [2009] proposed
a refined unp-privacy model, denoted as unp′-privacy. Compared with the orig-
inal unp-privacy model, an unp′-private RFID protocol requires that every PPT
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adversary not be able to distinguish transcripts of a single protocol session be-
tween the reader and a tag from random values. In the unp′-privacy definition, an
adversary is not allowed to issue multiple oracle queries on the challenge tag. Such
a limitation on the adversary is too restrictive in most practical applications. We
demonstrate this flaw of the unp′-privacy model with a counterexample 3-round
RFID protocol that has clear weakness with respect to privacy but is proven to sat-
isfy unp′-privacy. In the protocol, each tag maintains a state which is either s = 0 or
s = 1. A tag is in state s = 0 under normal circumstances and in state s = 1 other-
wise. An active attacker first sets a tag’s state to s = 1 by simplymodifying a protocol
message and then traces the tag in the subsequent protocol session. However, the
transcripts of a protocol session between the reader and a tag appear random. In
other words, the protocol is unp′-private but suffers from an apparent weakness in
privacy.
In our unp-privacy model, an adversary is allowed to issue multiple oracle
queries on the challenge tag. The underlying intuition of unp-privacy is that ev-
ery PPT adversary cannot distinguish the transcripts of multiple protocol sessions
between the reader and a real tag from those between the reader and a virtual tag,
which are random values.
(2) We prove that unp-privacy implies ind-privacy. Since there is an essential dif-
ference between these two notions, we bridge the gap by introducing a restricted
ind-privacy model, ind′-privacy, which is proven to be equivalent to ind-privacy.
Then, we prove that unp-privacy implies ind′-privacy. Moreover, we show that
ind-privacy does not imply unp-privacy by constructing an RFID system which is
ind-private but not unp-private.
(3) We determine the minimal condition for RFID tags to achieve unp-privacy in an
RFID system. It is shown that if an RFID system is unp-private, then each RFID
tag can be used to construct a pseudorandom function (PRF) family or its equiv-
alents provided that the RFID system is complete and sound. On the other hand,
if every tag is endowed with the capability to compute a PRF or its equivalents,
then an RFID system with unp-privacy can be constructed. The minimal require-
ment on the computational power for RFID tags shows that unp-privacy cannot
be guaranteed without implementing appropriate cryptographic functions. This
explains why many lightweight RFID protocols are vulnerable to privacy related
attacks.
(4) According to the minimal condition on RFID tags, we design an efficient RFID
protocol with unp-privacy and mutual authentication. In the case that a tag has
not been desynchronized (e.g., due to attacks) since the last successful read of
the tag, our protocol requires the minimal computational cost for identifying the
tag (in exact match). In the case that a tag has just been desynchronized, our
protocol requires exhaustive search for identifying the tag as in most of the existing
protocols.
We emphasize that ind-privacy [Juels and Weis 2007] is the correct notion for RFID
privacy and itmay not be necessary to havemore strengthened notions on RFID privacy
in practice. However, this notion is difficult to apply in security analysis in the sense
that no RFID protocols have been directly proven to satisfy the ind-privacy definition.
The notions of unp-privacy [Ha et al. 2008] and unp′-privacy [Ma et al. 2009] aim to
improve workability in security analysis of RFID protocols. Unfortunately, these two
notions are not ideal and have deficiencies. The new unp notion proposed in this paper
is based on unp-privacy and unp′-privacy but eliminates their shortcomings. This new
notion is formulated to be easier to work with and it implies ind-privacy. Another merit
of unp is that it is equivalent to the existence of PRF. This sheds new light on what
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Fig. 1. Relations among privacy notions.
it takes, from a theoretical point of view, to have secure and privacy-preserving RFID
systems.
1.2. Related Work
Avoine [2005] first formalized the adversary model in RFID systems and proposed very
general and flexible definitions of RFID privacy. Based on the formal adversary model,
Juels and Weis [2007] defined the notion of strong privacy. The aim of Avoine [2005]
was to capture a range of adversarial abilities, while Juels and Weis [2007] seeked to
characterize a very strong adversary with a relatively simple definition. The privacy
notion in Juels and Weis [2007] is based on the indistinguishability of two RFID tags,
denoted as ind-privacy. However, to our knowledge, there is no RFID protocol that has
been directly proven to be ind-private; On the other hand, if an RFID protocol is not
ind-private, it can be checked against the ind-privacy model easily.
Damga˚rd and Pedersen [2008] considered the completeness and soundness for RFID
systems. Vaudenay [2007] considerd side-channel attacks in his RFID privacy model
and proposed eight privacy classes, which were later consolidated to three by Ng et al.
[2008]. Paise and Vaudenay [2008] extended the definitions in Vaudenay [2007] to
address mutual authentication. However, the privacy definitions in Vaudenay [2007],
Ng et al. [2008], and Paise and Vaudenay [2008] contradict reader authentication for
any privacy notion that allows tag corruption [Paise and Vaudenay 2008].
Ha et al. [2008] proposed a different privacy model based on the unpredictability of
tag outputs, denoted as unp-privacy. Unfortunately, this model was later shown to have
some deficiencies in its definition [van Deursen and Radomirovic´ 2009]. Recently, Ma
et al. [2009] proposed a refined unp-privacy model for RFID systems, which we denote
as unp′-privacy for convenience. In this article, we show that the unp′-privacy model
has a deficiency when applied to 3-round RFID protocols.
Since it is extremely important to reduce the cost of RFID tags in practice, significant
effort has been made to construct lightweight RFID protocols for low-cost tags such
as EPC Class-1 Generation-2 tags. Sarma et al. [2003] analyzed the gate complexity
of the embedded chip with respect to the cost per tag. However, no research has been
conducted on theminimal computation power that should be endowed on tags to ensure
privacy.
To provide privacy for RFID systems, typical lightweight RFID protocols
[Karthikeyan and Nesterenko 2005; Duc et al. 2006; Chien and Chen 2007; Konidala
et al. 2007] exploit simple operations such as XOR, bit inner product, 16-bit pseudo-
random number generator (PRNG), and cyclic redundancy checksum (CRC). Most of
these protocols, however, have privacy flaws [Peris-Lopez et al. 2008; van Deursen
and Radomirovic 2008]. Juels [2004] proposed a pseudonym-throttling scheme without
using any cryptographic functions for tags. The privacy of this scheme is guaranteed
under the condition that the rate of pseudonym releases is slowed down to a certain
level. If this condition does not hold, the privacy of this scheme cannot be ensured.While
specific attacks have been discovered to break the privacy for different lightweight pro-
tocols, no theoretical model has been provided in the literature to explain why those
protocols are vulnerable to privacy attacks. In this paper, we prove that to guarantee
the privacy of an RFID system, it is necessary and sufficient to endow each tag with
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the ability to compute a pseudorandom function; thus it explains why many existing
lightweight protocols have privacy problems. We also provide an example to show how
to design an efficient protocol that provides privacy withminimal requirement on RFID
tags.
1.3. Organization
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we define the mathematical
notations and pseudorandom functions used in this article. In Section 3, we introduce
two privacy models, ind-privacy and unp-privacy, for RFID systems. We revisit the unp-
privacy model and its recent improvement and clarify their limitations in Section 4.
In Section 5, We introduce our privacy model, unp-privacy, to avoid the limitations
of previous unp-privacy models and establish its relation with the ind-privacy model.
In Section 6, we show that the minimal requirement to guarantee unp-privacy is
equipping each tag with the ability to compute a pseudorandom function. We also
provide an efficient construction of RFID protocol with unp-privacy according to the
minimal requirement on tags. In Section 7, we conclude this article and discuss some
open problems.
2. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce the preliminaries that will be used in this article, including
mathematical notations and pseudorandom functions.
2.1. Mathematical Notations
If A(·, ·, . . .) is a randomized algorithm, then y ← A(x1, x2, . . . ; cn) means that y is
assigned with the unique output of the algorithm A on inputs x1, x2, . . . and coins cn,
while y
$← A(x1, x2, . . .) is a shorthand for first picking cn at random and then setting
y ← A(x1, x2, . . . ; cn). Let y ← AO1,...,On(x1, x2, . . .) denote that y is assigned with the
output of the algorithm A which takes x1, x2, . . . as inputs and has oracle accesses to
O1, . . . , On. If S is a set, then s ∈R S indicates that s is chosen uniformly at random
from S. If x1, x2, . . . are strings, then x1||x2|| · · · denotes the concatenation of them. If x
is a string, then |x| denotes its bit length in binary code. If S is a set, then |S| denotes
its cardinality (i.e. the number of elements of S). Let Pr[E] denote the probability that
an event E occurs,N denote the set of all integers, R denote the set of all real numbers,
and ε denote the empty string.
Definition 2.1. A function f : N → R is said to be negligible if for every c > 0 there
exits a number m∈ N such that f (n) < 1nc holds for all n> m.
2.2. Pseudorandom Functions
Let F : K × D → R be a family of functions, where K is the set of keys (or indexes) of
F, D is the domain of F, and R is the range of F. Let |K| = γ , |D| = m, and |R| = n.
Let RandD→R be the family of all functions with domain D and range R. A polynomial
time predictable test (PTPT) for F is an experiment, where a probabilistic polynomial
time algorithm T , given γ,m,n as input and with access to an oracle Of for a function
f ∈R F or f ∈R RandD→R, outputs either 0 or 1. Figure 2 shows a PTPT for F.
Definition 2.2. An algorithm T passes the PTPT for the function family F if it
correctly guesses the random bit which is selected by PTPT experiment, i.e. b′ = b. The
advantage of algorithm T is defined as
AdvT (γ,m,n) =
∣∣∣
∣Pr[b
′ = b] − 1
2
∣∣∣
∣ ,
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ExpptptT (F, γ,m, n)
1. b ∈R {0, 1}
2. if b = 1 then k ∈R K and set f = Fk,
otherwise f ∈R RandD→R
3. b ← TOf
Fig. 2. Polynomial time predictable test.
where the probability is taken over the choice of f in F and the coin tosses of
algorithm T .
Definition 2.3. A function family F : K×D → R is said to be a pseudorandom function
family if it has the following properties:
Indexing. Each function in F has a unique γ -bit key (index) associated with it. It is
easy to select a function f ∈ F randomly if γ random bits are available.
Polynomial Time Evaluation. There exists a polynomial time algorithm such that,
given input of a key (index) k ∈ K and an argument x ∈ D, it outputs F(k, x).
Pseudorandomness. No probabilistic polynomial time algorithm T can pass thePTPT
for F with non-negligible advantage.
For convenience, we use Fk(x) and F(k, x) interchangeably for a PRF family F in this
paper.
3. IND-PRIVACY AND UNP-PRIVACY OF RFID SYSTEMS
In this section, we give a formal model for RFID system and two formal definitions for
RFID system privacy, ind-privacy and unp-privacy.
3.1. Model of RFID System
For simplicity, we consider an RFID system comprising of a single legitimate reader1 R
and a set of  tags T1, . . . , T. The reader and the tags are probabilistic polynomial time
interactive Turing machines. Typically, each tag is a passive transponder identified by
a unique ID and has only limited memory which can be used to store only several keys
and/or some state information. The reader is composed of one or more transceivers and
a backend processing subsystem. In this paper, we assume that the reader is secure,
which means that an adversary cannot obtain any information about the RFID system
from the legitimate reader except the information obtained fromRFID communications
and tags (in other words, the legitimate reader is a “black-box” to an adversary).
Canonical RFID Protocol. Every tag exchanges messages with the reader through a
protocol π . In the following, we use canonical protocol2 to describe a generic privacy-
preserving challenge-response RFID authentication protocol as shown in Figure 3. The
protocol π is invoked by the reader R sending a challenge message c to the tag Ti,
which upon receiving the challenge message c responds with a message r, where r
is computed according to the tag’s key kTi , the challenge message c, its coin toss cnTi ,
and its internal state sTi . We write r as r = FTi (kTi , cnTi , sTi , c), where FTi is a function
computed by the tag. This protocol can be executed in two or three rounds. In the
1It’s straightforward to extend the model to include multiple legitimate readers. Notice that an adversary
can use its own readers to interact with tags.
2To the best of our knowledge, our canonical protocol can be used to describe most of existing RFID protocols
except some of the HB family protocols [Hopper and Blum 2001; Juels and Weis 2005; Katz and Shin 2006],
which require more than three rounds to authenticate each tag in a statistical sense. We consider it an open
problem to extend our research to those protocols.
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, Vol. 14, No. 4, Article 30, Publication date: December 2011.
On Two RFID Privacy Notions and Their Relations 30:7
Reader R Tag Ti
c∈RPCH−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
r∈PFT←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
f∈PFR
Fig. 3. Canonical RFID protocol.
third round, if exists, the reader sends the tag the final message f , which is computed
according to the reader’s internal state sR, it’s coin toss cnR, the challenge message c,
and the tag’s response r. We write it as f = FR(kR, cnR, sR, c, r), where FR is a function
computed by the reader based on a key kR, which may or may not be the same as kTi . Let
PCH, PFT , PFR, PK, PCN, PS denote the challenge message space, the range of function
FT , the final message space, the key space of the tag, the coin space of the tag, and
the state information space of the tag, respectively. The view of an adversary about the
protocol π is the set {(c, r, f )}. Throughout this article, we only consider RFID protocols
in this canonical form.
Definition 3.1. An RFID system RS is defined to be a tuple (R, T , ReaderSetup,
TagSetup, ReaderStart, TagCompute, ReaderCompute, π ), where
ReaderSetup(κ). It is a setup procedure which generates the system parameter σ and
key kR (if needed) for the reader R according to the security parameter κ. It also setups
a database for the reader R to store necessary information for tag identification.
TagSetup(Ti, κ). It is a setup procedure which generates key kTi for a tag Ti and sets
the tag’s initial internal state st0. It also associates the tag Ti with its unique ID as
well as other necessary information such as tag key and/or tag state information as a
record in the database of reader R.
ReaderStart. It is an algorithm for reader R to generate a session identifier sid of a
new session and a challenge message csid of the session.
TagCompute(Ti, sid, csid). It is an algorithm for tag Ti to compute its response rsid,
taking a session identifier sid and challenge message csid as input.
ReaderCompute(sid, csid, rsid). It is an algorithm for the reader R to compute the
final message fsid, taking a session identifier sid, challenge message csid and response
message rsid as input.
Protocol π (R, Ti). It is a canonical interactive protocol between the reader R and the
tag Ti. We associate each session of protocol π with a unique session identifier sid. As
an abusing of the notation, let
(csid, rsid, fsid) ← π (R, Ti, sid)
denote the running of protocol π between R and Ti with challenge message csid and ses-
sion identifier sid. The external output of the protocol π (R, Ti) is the tuple (csid, rsid, fsid).
A tuple (c, r, f ) is said to be a valid set of protocol messages of π (R, Ti) if there exists a
session identifier sid such that
π (R, Ti, sid) = (c, r, f ).
A tag Ti is said to be accepted if its corresponding record is identified by the reader
R in its database upon performing the protocol π (R, Ti).
Note that, the ReaderStart, TagCompute and ReaderCompute algorithms can be
obtained from the protocol π . For convenience, we use RS = (R, T , ReaderSetup,
TagSetup, π ) to denote an RFID system.
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Experiment ExpsoundA [ ]
1. setup the reader R and a set of tags T with |T | = ;
2.{(csid∗ , rsid∗ , fsid∗), Tj} ← AO1,O2,O4(R, T ).
Fig. 4. Soundness experiment.
3.2. Description of Adversary
In a nutshell, an adversary A is a probabilistic polynomial time interactive Turing
machine that is allowed to perform oracle queries during attacks. In the following, we
specify what kinds of oracles the adversary A is permitted to query.
InitReader. It invokes the reader R to start a session of protocol π and generate
a session identifier sid and challenge message csid ∈R PCH . The reader returns the
session identifier sid and the challenge message csid.
InitTag(Ti, sid, csid). It invokes tag Ti to start a session of protocol π with session
identifier sid and challenge message csid ∈ PCH . The tag Ti responds with the session
identifier sid and a message rsid ∈ PFT .
SetTag(Ti). It updates different key and state information to tag Ti and returns the
tag’s current key and internal state information.
SendRes(sid, c, r). It takes the challenge and response messages c, r with session
identifier sid as input and (in three-round protocol) returns the reader’s final message
fsid.
Let O1, O2, O3 and O4 denote InitReader, InitTag, SetTag and SendRes oracles, respec-
tively.
Remark 1. The four kinds of queries defined above can be used to model most, if not
all, of the attacks to RFID communications or tags, including eavesdropping, alteration
of communication messages, replay attacks, corruption of tags, and physical or side-
channel attacks to tags. For example, eavesdropping can be modeled as follows: first
call InitReader() to get (sid, csid), then call InitTag(sid, csid) to get (sid, rsid), and finally
call SendRes(sid, csid, rsid) to get fsid. For another example, any tag key compromise
due to tag corruption, physical or side-channel attacks can be modeled by sending the
SetTag query to the tag.
3.3. Completeness and Soundness of RFID Systems
Here, we review the definitions of completeness and soundness of RFID systems pre-
sented in [Damga˚rd and Pedersen 2008]. Informally, completeness means that a legit-
imate tag will always be accepted by the legitimate reader, and the soundness means
that only a legitimate tag will be accepted by the legitimate reader.
Definition 3.2Completeness. Assume that at the end of every session sid the output of
that session is the tuple (csid, rsid, fsid), where rsid is correctly generated by a legitimate
tag. Completeness means that the reader outputs “accept” with probability 1 for any
such session.
Next, consider the soundness experiment ExpsoundA [κ, ,q, s, v] as shown in Figure 4,
where ,q, s, v are experiment parameters. The adversary A is given an RFID system
RS as input and is allowed to launch O1, O2 and O4 oracle queries without exceeding
q, s and v overall calls, respectively. At the end of the experiment, A outputs a tuple
(csid∗ , rsid∗ , fsid∗ ) and a tag T j ∈ T . Let E denote the event that rsid∗ is not sent by tag
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Experiment ExpindA [ ]
1. setup the reader R and a set of tags T with |T | = ;
2. {Ti, Tj , st} ← AO1,O2,O3,O41 (R, T ); //learning stage
3. set T = T − {Ti, Tj};
4. b ∈R {0, 1};
5. if b = 0 then Tc = Ti, else Tc = Tj ;
6. b ← AO1,O2,O3,O42 (R, T , st, Tc); //guess stage
7. the experiment outputs 1 if b = b, 0 otherwise.
Fig. 5. Ind-privacy experiment.
T j in session sid∗ while the reader R accepts the tag T j in session sid∗ with protocol
message tuple (csid∗ , rsid∗ , fsid∗ ).
Definition 3.3. An adversaryA (	, t,q, s, v)-breaks the soundness of the RFID system
RS if the probability that event E occurs is at least 	 and the running time of A is at
most t.
Definition 3.4 Soundness. The RFID system RS provides (	, t,q, s, v)-soundness if
there exists no adversary A which can (	, t,q, s, v)-break the soundness of RS.3
3.4. Ind-Privacy
Juels and Weis [Juels and Weis 2007] presented an indistinguishability-based RFID
privacy model which is reminiscent of the classic indistinguishability under chosen-
plaintext attack (IND-CPA) and under chosen-ciphertext attack (IND-CCA) in cryp-
tosystem security.
Figure 5 illustrates the ind-privacy experiment ExpindA [κ, ,q, s,u, v] (Exp
ind
A , for
simplicity), in which an adversary A is comprised of a pair of algorithms (A1,A2)
and runs in two stages. Throughout the experiment, the adversary A is allowed to
launch O1, O2, O3 and O4 oracle queries without exceeding q, s,u and v overall calls,
respectively. The experiment proceeds as follows. At first, the experiment initializes
the RFID system by producing a reader R and a set of tags T = {T1, . . . , T} according
to the security parameter κ. Then, in the learning stage, algorithm A1 outputs a state
information st and a pair of tags {Ti, T j} to which it has not sent SetTag queries. Next,
the experiment selects a random bit b and sets the challenge tag Tc = Ti if b = 0,
and Tc = T j otherwise. Finally, in the guess stage, algorithm A2 is asked to guess
the random bit b by outputting a bit b′. During this stage, algorithm A2 is allowed to
launch O1, O2, O3 and O4 oracle queries to Tc and the tag set T ′ = T − {Ti, T j} with the
restriction that it cannot query SetTag(Tc).
Definition 3.5. The advantage of adversaryA in the experiment ExpindA [κ, ,q, s, u, v]
is defined as:
AdvindA (κ, ,q, s,u, v) =
∣∣∣
∣Pr
[
ExpindA [κ, ,q, s,u, v] = 1
] − 1
2
∣∣∣
∣,
3Our definition of soundness is compatible with the weak soundness introduced in [Damga˚rd and Pedersen
2008], in which strong soundness has also been defined (strong soundness allows an adversary to launch
SetTag oracle, or O3, queries to corrupt any tags except the tag T j ).
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Experiment ExpunpA [ ]
1. setup the reader R and a set of tags T with |T | = ;
2. {Tc, st} ← AO1,O2,O3,O41 (R, T ); //learning stage
3. b ∈R {0, 1};
4. if b = 0 then r∗ ∈R PRS ,
else r∗ is taken from (c∗, r∗, f∗)← π(R,Tc, sid);
5. b ← A2(r∗, st); //guess stage
6. the experiment outputs 1 if b = b, 0 otherwise.
Fig. 6. Unp-privacy experiment.
where the probability is taken over the choice of tag set T and the coin tosses of the
adversary A.
Definition 3.6. An adversary A (	, t,q, s,u, v)-breaks the ind-privacy of RFID system
RS if the advantage AdvindA (k, ,q, s,u, v) of A in the experiment ExpindA is at least 	
and the running time of A is at most t.
Definition 3.7 (	, t,q, s,u, v)-Ind-Privacy. An RFID system RS is said to be
(	, t,q, s,u, v)-ind-private if there exists no adversary who can (	, t,q, s,u, v)-break the
ind-privacy of RS.
Remark 2. The ind-privacy implies that an adversary cannot distinguish between
any two tags in the tag set T which the adversary has not corrupted. This definition
can be easily extended to the case where an adversary cannot distinguish between any
ι tags in the tag set T that have not been corrupted. This latter case may be considered
as an application of the notion of ι-privacy (or ι-anonymity) [Samarati and Sweeney
1998] in the RFID system we defined.
3.5. Unp-Privacy
The goal of the adversary in the above ind-privacy game is to distinguish two different
tags within its computational power and parameters. The idea is intuitively appealing;
however, the ind-privacy model is difficult to apply directly in proving a given protocol
is ind-private. To our knowledge, no mutual authentication RFID protocol has been
proven directly to be ind-private. To address this concern, Ha et al. [2008] proposed
a different privacy model based on the unpredictability of tag outputs, denoted as
unp-privacy.
Figure 6 illustrates the unp-privacy experiment ExpunpA [κ, ,q, s,u, v] (Exp
unp
A , for
simplicity), in which an adversary is also comprised of a pair of algorithms (A1,A2)
and runs in two stages. In the learning stage, algorithm A1 is required to select only
one challenge tag Tc. It also outputs a state information st which will be transmitted to
algorithmA2. Throughout the experiment, adversary A is allowed to launch O1, O2, O3
and O4 oracle queries without exceeding q, s,u and v overall calls respectively under
the condition that A1 cannot query SetTag(Tc). Then in the guess stage, algorithm A2
is required to infer whether the challenge message r∗ is chosen from the output of
running the protocol π (R, Tc). Note that, A2 is not allowed to query any oracle.
Definition 3.8. The advantage of adversary A in the experiment ExpunpA is defined as:
AdvunpA (κ, ,q, s,u, v) =
∣∣∣∣Pr
[
ExpunpA [κ, ,q, s,u, v] = 1
] − 1
2
∣∣∣∣,
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, Vol. 14, No. 4, Article 30, Publication date: December 2011.
On Two RFID Privacy Notions and Their Relations 30:11
Experiment ExpunpA [ ]
1. setup the reader R and a set of tags T with |T | = ;
2. {Tc, c0, st} ← AO1,O2,O3,O41 (R, T ); //learning stage
3. set T = T − {Tc};
4. b ∈R {0, 1};
5. if b = 0 then (r∗, f∗) ∈R PRS × PFR,
else run the protocol with the challenge message c0;
get the transcripts of the protocol execution (c0, r0, f0);
set (r∗, f∗) = (r0, f0);
6. b ← AO1,O2,O3,O42 (R, T , st,r ∗, f ∗); //guess stage
7. the experiment outputs 1 if b = b, 0 otherwise.
Fig. 7. Unp′-privacy experiment.
where the probability is taken over the choice of tag set T and the coin tosses of the
adversary A.
Definition 3.9. An adversary A (	, t,q, s,u, v)-breaks the unp-privacy of RFID system
RS if the advantage AdvunpA (κ, ,q, s,u, v) of A in the experiment ExpunpA is at least 	
and the running time of A is at most t.
Definition 3.10 (	, t,q, s,u, v)-Unp-Privacy. An RFID system RS is said to be
(	, t,q, s,u, v)-unp-private if there exists no adversary who can (	, t,q, s, ,u, v)-break
the unp-privacy of RS.
4. LIMITATIONS OF UNP-PRIVACY MODEL AND RECENT IMPROVEMENT
Note that in the unp-privacy game, the adversary A2 does not get the full transcript
of the RFID protocol execution between the reader and the challenge tag, but only
r∗ which is either a random message or the message sent by the tag. As a result, an
RFID protocol having known weakness in privacy (e.g., protocol messages are traceable
by an adversary) can be shown to be unp-private, as confirmed by van Deursen and
Radomirovic´ [2009].
At CCS’09, Ma et al. [2009] proposed an improved unp-privacy model, which we
denote as unp′-privacy for convenience. In the unp′-privacy model, the adversary is
given not only r∗, but also the last message f ∗ of the protocol. The unp′-privacy model
is robust for 2-round RFID protocols, as demonstrated in Ma et al. [2009]; however,
we will show in this section that the model has a deficiency when applied to 3-round
protocols. In such cases, an active attacker can trace a tag in an unp′-private RFID
system.
4.1. Unp′-Privacy Model
Figure 7 illustrates the unp′-privacy experiment Expunp
′
A [κ, ,q, s,u, v] (Exp
unp′
A , for
simplicity), in which an adversary is also comprised of a pair of algorithms (A1,A2)
and runs in two stages. In the learning stage, algorithm A1 is required to select only
one challenge tag Tc and a test message c0 ∈ PCH . It also outputs a state information
st which will be transmitted to algorithm A2. Throughout the experiment, adversary
A is allowed to launch O1, O2, O3 and O4 oracle queries without exceeding q, s,u and v
overall calls respectively under the condition that A1 cannot query SetTag(Tc). Then in
the guess stage, algorithm A2 has oracle accesses to tags except Tc and is required to
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Reader R
{(Ii, ki, ctri, IDi)}
Tag Ti
(ki, ctri, si)
c ∈R{0,1}lc−−−−−−−−−−→
r1 Ii,r2←−−−−−−−−−−
r2 ∈R {0, 1}lp2,
Ii = Fki(ctri pad1),
If si = 0,
r1 = Fki(c Ii pad2)⊕ ctri;
Else,
r1 = Fki (c Ii r2)⊕ ctri.
ctri = ctri + 1,
si = 1.
If find the tuple (Ii, ki, ctri, IDi), then
If ctri = Fki(c Ii pad2)⊕ r1, then
update ctri = ctri + 1 and Ii = Fk(ctri pad1),
compute f = Fki(c ctri r2) and accept the tag.
Else abort.
Else If ∃(Ii, ki, ctri, IDi) such that
ctri = Fki (c Ii r2) ⊕ r1 and Fki(ctri pad1) = Ii,
then
update ctri = ctri + 1 and Ii = Fki(ctri pad1)
compute f = Fki(c ctri r2) and accept the tag.
Else abort.
f−−−−−−−−−−→
If f = Fki(c ctri r2),
set si = 0 and accept the reader.
Else,
reject the reader.
Fig. 8. Counterexample.
infer whether the challenge message pair (r∗, f ∗) is chosen from the output of running
the protocol π (R, Tc) with test message c0.
Definition 4.1. The advantage of adversary A in the experiment Expunp′A is defined
as:
Advunp
′
A (κ, ,q, s,u, v) =
∣
∣∣∣Pr
[
Expunp
′
A [κ, ,q, s,u, v] = 1
] − 1
2
∣
∣∣∣ ,
where the probability is taken over the choice of tag set T and the coin tosses of the
adversary A.
Definition 4.2. An adversaryA (	, t,q, s,u, v)-breaks the unp′-privacy of RFID system
RS if the advantage Advunp
′
A (κ, ,q, s,u, v) of A in the experiment Expunp
′
A is at least 	
and the running time of A is at most t.
Definition 4.3 (	, t,q, s,u, v)-Unp′-Privacy. An RFID system RS is said to be
(	, t,q, s,u, v)-unp′-private if there exists no adversary who can (	, t,q, s, ,u, v)-break
the unp′-privacy of RS.
4.2. A Counterexample
Ma et al. [2009] introduced an efficient 2-round protocol and proved that it is unp′-
private, where the adversary is provided with tag response r∗ only in the guess stage.
The unp′-privacy model is robust for 2-round RFID protocols, as demonstrated in Ma
et al. [2009]; however, we show that the model has a deficiency when applied to 3-round
protocols.
Wemodify the 2-round protocol ofMa et al. [2009] to a 3-roundmutual authentication
protocol as illustrated in Figure 8 and show that the new protocol has clear weakness
with respect to privacy but can be proven to be unp′-private. This example therefore
exposes a deficiency of the unp′-privacy model when it is applied to 3-round mutual
authentication protocols.
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Let F : {0,1}lk × {0,1}ld → {0,1}lr be a PRF family. Let ctr ∈ {0,1}lr be a counter. Let
pad1 ∈ {0,1}lp1 and pad2 ∈ {0,1}lp2 be two paddings such that lr + lp1 = ld. The RFID
system is constructed as follows.
ReaderSetup(κ). It sets up a reader R with σ = {F, pad1, pad2} according to security
parameter κ.
TagSetup(Ti, κ). It sets up a tag Ti with a key ki ∈ {0,1}lk, a counter ctri = 1 and a
1-bit flag si = 0. It also stores a tuple (Ii,ki, ctri, IDi) in the reader’s database, where
Ii = Fki (ctri‖pad1) and IDi is the tag’s identity.
Protocol π (R, Ti). R first sends a challenge c ∈R {0,1}lc to Ti, where lc + lr + lp2 = ld.
Upon receiving c, Ti executes the following steps:
(1) Randomly choose r2 ∈ {0,1}lp2 and compute Ii = Fki (ctri‖pad1);
(2) Set r1 = Fki (c‖Ii‖pad2) ⊕ ctri if si = 0, else set r1 = Fki (c‖Ii‖r2) ⊕ ctri;
(3) Respond with (r1‖Ii, r2), increment ctri by 1 and set si = 1.
Upon receiving the response (r1‖Ii, r2),R identifies the tag from its database as follows.
(1) Search for the tuple (Ii,ki, ctr′i, IDi) using Ii as an index. If such a tuple exists,
compute Fki (c‖Ii‖pad2) and then
(a) If ctr′i = Fki (c‖Ii‖pad2)⊕r1, update ctr′i = ctr′i+1 and Ii = Fki (ctr′i‖pad1), respond
with f = Fki (c‖ctr′i‖r2) and accept the tag;
(b) Else abort the protocol.
(2) Else look up the database for a tuple (I′i ,ki, ctr
′
i, IDi) in an exhaustive search such
that ctri = Fki (c‖Ii‖r2) ⊕ r1 and Fki (ctri‖pad1) = Ii. Then
(a) If such a tuple exists, update ctr′i = ctri + 1 and I′i = Fki (ctr′i ||pad1), respond
with f = Fki (c‖ctr′i‖r2) and accept the tag;
(b) Else abort the protocol.
Upon receiving f , Ti checks whether f = Fki (c‖ctri‖r2). If not, Ti rejects the reader.
Else, Ti sets si = 0 and accepts the reader.
A flaw of the protocol is that an active attacker can find out whether a tag’s state
is s = 0 or s = 1. If a tag is in state s = 0, the reader does not verify the integrity of
r2; while if the tag is in state s = 1, this verification occurs implicitly. Note that under
normal circumstances tags will be in state s = 0. Hence, an active attacker can flag
a tag by setting its state to s = 1 and trace the tag in subsequent protocol sessions.
However, the following theorem states that the protocol is unp′-private.
CLAIM 1. The given mutual authentication RFID protocol is unp′-private, assuming
the function family F : {0,1}lk × {0,1}ld → {0,1}lr is a PRF family.
PROOF. Assume that the protocol in Figure 8 is not unp′-private. That is, there ex-
ists an adversary A who can (	, t,q, s,u, v)-break the unp′-privacy of the protocol. We
construct an algorithm B that can pass the PTPT for the function family F.
On the input of an oracle Of for a function f = Fk or f ∈R RandD→R, algorithm B
invokes A and simulates the unp′-privacy experiment for A as follows.
Simulate the learning stage. Initially, B selects an index i between 1 and  randomly
and sets the initial state of the tag Ti as ctri = 1, si = 0. The key of Ti is implicitly
set to be k, which is unknown to B. For 1 ≤ j ≤  and j 
= i, B selects a random key
(index) kj ∈R {0,1}κ1 , then sets the key and the internal state of the tag T j as kj and
ctrj = 1, sj = 0, respectively.
When adversary A asks queries about O1, O2, O3 and O4, algorithm B uses Of and
the keys k1, . . . ,ki−1,ki+1, . . . ,k to respond. Note that, when A issues O3 query on tag
Ti, B aborts and randomly outputs a bit.
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Experiment ExpunpA [ ]
1. setup the reader R and a set of tags T with |T | = ;
2. {Tc, st} ← AO1,O2,O3,O41 (R↪ T ); //learning stage
3. b ∈R {0, 1};
4. b ← AO1,O2,O42 (R, Tc,st ); //guess stage
4.1 when A2 queries O1, O2 and O4 oracles, if b = 1, run the algorithm
ReaderStart, TagCompute, ReaderCompute respectively, and return the results;
4.2 else b = 0, return a random element from PCH , PFT , PFR, respectively.
5. the experiment outputs 1 if b = b, 0 otherwise.
Fig. 9. Unp∗-privacy experiment.
Simulate the challenge stage. A submits a test message c0 ∈ {0,1}lc and an uncor-
rupted challenge tag Tc. If Tc 
= Ti, B aborts and randomly outputs a bit. Otherwise, B
proceeds as follows.
(1) Randomly choose r2 ∈ {0,1}lp2 .
(2) Set x = ctri‖pad1, query Of on x and get the response Ii.
(3) If si = 0, query Of on x = c0‖Ii‖pad2, get the response y and set r1 = y ⊕ ctri; else
query its oracle on x = c0‖Ii‖r2, get the response y and set r1 = y⊕ ctri.
(4) Set r∗ = (r1‖Ii, r2) and update ctri = ctri + 1 and si = 0.
(5) Query Of on c0‖ctri‖r2, get the response f ∗, and send (r∗, f ∗) to A.
Simulate the guess stage. Algorithm B answers adversary A’s queries about O1,
O2, O3, O4 using Of and the keys k1, . . . ,ki−1,ki+1, . . . ,k.
Output. Finally, adversary A outputs a bit b′. B also takes b′ as its output.
If B does not abort during the simulation, B’s simulation is perfect and is identically
distributed as the real one from the construction. It is obvious that the probability that
B does not abort during the simulation is 1

. Therefore, the advantage of B is at least 	

.
The running time of B is approximate to that of A. This completes the proof.
5. A NEW PRIVACY MODEL, UNP∗-PRIVACY
The limitation in the definition of unp′-privacy, as shown in the counterexample, is due
to the constraint imposed on the adversary A2, that is, A2 only has access to r∗ and f ∗
as supplied by the challenger and is not allowed to query oracles on the challenge tag
Tc. In this section, we propose a new RFID privacy model, denoted as unp∗-privacy, as
a remedy to this problem.
The intuition of the unp∗-privacy model is that no adversary should be able to distin-
guish the output of a real tag from that of a virtual tag, given transcripts of multiple
procotol sessions of both, where a virtual tag is defined as a tag without any secret in-
formation. This implies that no adversary can link a real tag and its behavior without
learning its secret key. We emphasize that our unp∗-privacy model does not impose any
restrictions on the number of oracle queries issued by the adversary on the challenge
tag. In what follows, we introduce the unp∗-privacy model, investigate the relationship
between this new model and the ind-privacy model.
5.1. Unp∗-Privacy Model
Figure 9 illustrates the unp∗-privacy experiment Expunp

A [κ, ,q, s,u, v] (Exp
unp
A , for
simplicity), in which an adversary is also comprised of a pair of algorithms (A1,A2)
and runs in two stages. Throughout the experiment, adversary A is allowed to
launch O1, O2, O3, and O4 oracle queries without exceeding q, s,u, and v overall calls
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respectively. In the learning stage, algorithm A1 issues O1, O2, O3, and O4 oracle
queries, and output an uncorrupted challenge tag Tc. It also outputs a state infor-
mation st which will be transmitted to algorithm A2. Next, the experiment selects a
random bit b. Algorithm A2 is allowed to query O1, O2, and O4 oracles on R and Tc. The
experiment responds to A2 queries as follows:
InitReader. If b = 0, generate a new session identifier sid, choose csid ∈R PCH and
forward (sid, csid) to A2; else, run the algorithm ReaderStart, and forward the result to
A2.
InitTag(Tc, sid, csid). If b = 0, choose rsid ∈ PFT and forward rsid to A2; else, run the
algorithm TagCompute(Tc, sid, csid) and forward the result to A2.
SendRes(sid, csid, rsid). If b = 0, choose fsid ∈ PFR and forward fsid to A2; else, run
the algorithm ReaderCompute(sid, csid, rsid) and forward the result to A2.
Finally, A2 is asked to guess the value of the random bit.
Definition 5.1. The advantage of adversary A in the experiment ExpunpA is defined
as:
Advunp

A (κ, ,q, s,u, v) =
∣∣∣
∣Pr
[
Expunp

A [κ, ,q, s,u, v] = 1
] − 1
2
∣∣∣
∣,
where the probability is taken over the choice of tag set T and the coin tosses of the
adversary A.
Definition 5.2. An adversaryA (	, t,q, s,u, v)-breaks the unp-privacy of RFID system
RS if the advantage Advunp

A (κ, ,q, s,u, v) of A in the experiment Expunp

A is at least 	
and the running time of A is at most t.
Definition 5.3. (	, t,q, s,u, v)-Unp-Privacy. An RFID system RS is said to be
(	, t,q, s,u, v)-unp-private if there exists no adversary who can (	, t,q, s, ,u, v)-break
the unp-privacy of RS.
Note that the protocol given in Figure 8 does not satisfy our privacy model. In
the unp-privacy experiment, if b = 0, the adversary modifies the second message
randomly; with overwhelming probability, the third message of the protocol is empty.
However, if b = 1, the third message is always a random value and not empty. So,
with overwhelming probability, the adversary can distinguish the two cases. Hence,
the protocol in Figure 8 is not unp-private.
5.2. Relation between Unp∗-Privacy and Ind-Privacy
We investigate the relation between ind-privacy and unp∗-privacy. For this purpose, we
introduce a restricted ind-privacymodel, called ind′-privacy, as a “bridge” to show that it
is equivalent to ind-privacy and that unp∗-privacy implies ind′-privacy. Then, we show
that ind-privacy does not imply unp∗-privacy by constructing an RFID system which is
ind-private but not unp∗-private. Overall, we prove that unp∗-privacy is stronger than
ind-privacy.
While the notion of ind-privacy may suffice, it is more difficult to use in proving
security for an RFID system than the notion of unp∗-privacy. In fact, most of ind-
privacy proofs known so far, including the proof in the original paper [Juels and Weis
2007], use unp∗-privacy as a bridge, showing that every PPT adversary is not able to
distinguish the transcripts of protocol execution from random values. One technical
challenge of applying ind-privacy is how to transfer the ability to distinguish between
two tags to the ability to break a cryptographic primitive or to solve a hard problem.
Another difference is that unp∗-privacy restricts the adversary from making queries
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Experiment ExpindA [ ]
1. setup the reader R and a set of tags T with |T | = ;
2. {Ti, Tj , st} ← AO1,O2,O3,O41 (R, T ); //learning stage
3. b ∈R {0, 1};
4. if b = 0 then Tc = Ti, else Tc = Tj ;
5. b ← AO1,O2,O42 (R, Tc, st); //guess stage
6. the experiment outputs 1 if b = b, 0 otherwise.
Fig. 10. Ind′-privacy experiment.
on the set T ′ in the second stage of the game. Such restriction can make the security
proof more concise. Intuitively, ind-privacy implies that a tag cannot be distinguished
from a group of tags in an RFID system, which may demonstrate a unique pattern as
a group (e.g., with common prefix in protocol transcripts), while unp∗-privacy requires
that a tag’s interaction with a reader does not have any such group patterns.
5.2.1. Ind′-Privacy. Figure 10 shows the ind′-privacy experiment Expind
′
A [κ, ,q, s,u, v]
(Expind
′
A , for simplicity), which is identical to the ind-privacy experiment given in Fig-
ure 5 except thatA2 inExpind′A is not allowed to query oracles on other tags except for Tc.
Definition 4.1. The advantage of adversary A in the ind′-privacy experiment Expind′A
is defined as:
Advind
′
A (κ, ,q, s,u, v) =
∣∣∣
∣Pr
[
Expind
′
A = 1
] − 1
2
∣∣∣
∣,
where the probability is taken over the choice of tag set T and the coin tosses of the
adversary A.
Definition 4.2. An adversary A (	, t,q, s,u, v)-breaks the ind′-privacy of RFID system
RS if its advantage Advind
′
A (κ, ,q, s,u, v) in the experiment Exp
ind′
A is at least 	 and its
running time is at most t.
Definition 4.3 (	, t,q, s,u, v)-Ind′-Privacy. An RFID system RS is said to be
(	, t,q, s,u, v)-ind′-private if there exists no adversary A who can (	, t,q, s, ,u, v)-break
the ind′-privacy of RS.
5.2.2. Ind-Privacy ⇐⇒ Ind ′-Privacy. The only difference between ind-privacy and ind′-
privacy is that, in ind-privacy the adversary can issue oracle queries on any tag in
T ′ ∩ {Tc} in the guess stage, while in ind′-privacy the adversary can only issue oracle
queries on Tc in the guess stage. In other words, ind′-privacy puts more restrictions
on the adversary, so ind-privacy implies ind′-privacy. However, in ind′-privacy, the
adversary can issue O3 queries on all tags in T ′ in the learning stage, obtain the
secrets and states of all tags in T ′ and store them in a list TagKey-List. In the guess
stage, when the adversary wants to make O1, O2, O3, O4 queries on any tag in T ′, the
adversary can obtain the corresponding query answers itself using the list TagKey-
List. As a result, the restriction on the adversary does not weaken its power in the
ind′-privacy model, and ind′-privacy implies ind-privacy.
THEOREM 1. For an RFID system RS = (R, T , ReaderSetup, TagSetup, π ), ind-
privacy is equivalent to ind′-privacy.
PROOF. It is obvious that ind-privacy =⇒ ind′-privacy holds.
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Now we formally prove that ind-privacy ⇐= ind′-privacy holds. Assume that RS is
not ind-private. That is, there exists an adversary A such that it (	, t,q, s,u1, v)-breaks
the ind-privacy of RS. We construct an algorithm B that uses A as a subroutine and
(	, t,q, s,u2, v)-breaks the ind′-privacy of RS, where u2 ≤ u1 +  − 2. The algorithm B
proceeds as follows. On the input of the RFID system RS and the security parameter κ,
it invokes adversary A with input RS and κ and conducts the ind-privacy experiment
with A as follows.
Simulate the learning stage. When adversary A asks queries about O1, O2, O3 and
O4, algorithm B also queries them in the ind′-privacy experiment Expind
′
B and returns
the responses to adversary A accordingly.
Simulate the challenge stage. When adversary A outputs two uncorrupted tags
Ti, T j ∈ T , algorithm B submits the same two tags Ti and T j in the ind′-privacy ex-
periment Expind
′
B which responds with a challenge tag Tc ∈ {Ti, T j}. Then, B issues O3
queries on the tag set T − {Ti, T j} and stores the results in a list TagKey-List. Finally, B
forwards Tc to A.
Simulate the guess stage. When adversary A asks queries about O1, O2, O3 and O4,
algorithm B uses its oracles O1, O2, O4 and the list TagKey-List to respond.
Output. If A outputs a bit b′, then B also takes it as its output.
It is obvious that the simulation is perfect. Thus we have shown an adversary A
against the ind-privacy of the RFID system RS with advantage 	 can be used to
construct another adversary B against the ind′-privacy of the same RFID system with
an identical advantage.
The number of times that B queries the O3 oracle is at most u1 +  − 2. The running
time of B is approximate to that of A. This completes the proof.
5.2.3. Unp∗-Privacy =⇒ Ind ′-Privacy. Recall that unp-privacy means that every PPT
adversary is not able to distinguish the transcripts of the protocol execution between
the reader and a real tag from those of protocol execution between the reader and
a virtual tag, which are random values. The underlying intuition of ind′-privacy is
that every PPT adversary cannot distinguish the transcripts of the protocol execution
between the reader and two distinct tags. It is obvious that a PPT adversary cannot
distinguish between one random value and another random value. So, if the transcripts
of the protocol execution between the reader and each tag looks random, the adversary
cannot distinguish the transcripts of the protocol execution between the reader and
two tags. In other words, unp-privacy implies ind′-privacy.
THEOREM 2. Assume that the RFID system RS = (R, T , ReaderSetup, TagSetup, π )
is (	, t,q, s,u, v)-unp∗-private, then it is (	, t,q, s,u, v)-ind′-private.
PROOF. Assume that RS is not ind′-private. That is, there exists an adversaryAwhich
can (	, t,q, s,u, v)-break the ind′-privacy of RS. Then, we construct an algorithm B that
runs A as a subroutine and (	, t,q, s,u, v)-breaks the unp∗-privacy of RS.
Given an RFID system RS and the security parameter κ, algorithm B invokesAwith
the same input and simulates the ind′-privacy experiment for A as follows.
Simulate the learning stage. Algorithm B answers adversary A’s queries about
O1, O2, O3, O4 by asking them in the unp∗-privacy experiment.
Simulate the challenge stage. When adversary A outputs two uncorrupted tags
Ti, T j ∈ T , algorithm B selects a random bit b ∈ {0,1} and sets the challenge tag
Tc = Ti if b = 0 and Tc = T j otherwise. Finally, B forwards Tc to A, and also submits Tc
in the unp∗-privacy experiment as its own challenge tag.
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Simulate the guess stage. Algorithm B answers adversary A’s queries about O1,
O2, O4 by asking them in the unp∗-privacy experiment.
Output. Finally, adversary A outputs a bit b′. If b′ = b, algorithm B outputs 1,
otherwise it outputs 0.
The simulation of B is perfect. When the internal random bit selected by the unp∗-
privacy experiment is equal to 1, the probability of b′ = b is equal to 12 ± 	; otherwise,
the probability of b′ = b is equal to 12 , because in this case the challenge tag Tc is in
fact a virtual tag in adversary A’s view. Hence, the advantage of B is equal to that of A
(i.e., 	).
The running time of B is exactly the same as that of A. This completes the proof.
5.2.4. Unp∗-Privacy =⇒ Ind-Privacy. From Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, one can derive the
following:
THEOREM 3. Assume that the RFID system RS is unp∗-private, then it is ind-private.
5.2.5. Ind-Privacy =⇒/ Unp∗-privacy. An ind-private RFID protocol implies that the distri-
butions of protocol transcripts between reader and any two tags are computationally
indistinguishable. Note that, the distribution could be any distribution, not necessarily
random distribution. A unp∗-privacy RFID protocol requires that the distribution of
the protocol transcripts is random. Hence, ind-privacy does not imply unp∗-privacy.
Let RS = {R, T , ReaderSetup, TagSetup, π} be any RFID system. We construct a
new RFID system RS′ = {R, T , ReaderSetup, TagSetup, π ′} such that for every pro-
tocol message (c, r, f ) ← π (R,Ti), we have (c, r||r, f ) ← π ′(R,Ti). Then, we have the
following:
THEOREM 4. If the RFID system RS is ind-private, then the RFID system RS′ is also
ind-private, but not unp∗-private.
PROOF. It is easy to see that RS′ is ind-private if RS is ind-private. We proceed to
show that it is not unp∗-private. Since every protocol message of π ′ is in the form
(c, r||r, f ) ∈ PCH × P2RS × PFR, the adversary can easily distinguish it from a random
tuple (c′, r1||r2, f ′) chosen from PCH×P2RS×PFR by checking whether r1 = r2. Therefore,
RS′ is not unp∗-private.
This theorem indicates that ind-privacy does not imply unp∗-privacy. In the practical
sense, ind-privacy does not necessarily mean that an adversary cannot distinguish a
tag (or a group of tags) in an RFID system from a tag (or a group of tags) in another
RFID system, while unp∗-privacy does if the protocol messages have the same length.
6. UNP∗-PRIVACY ⇐⇒ PRF
In this section, we investigate the minimal requirement for RFID systems to achieve
unp∗-privacy. Since an RFID reader is usually equipped with enough computational
power, we assume that the reader is not resource-limited and focus on the minimal
requirement for RFID tags only. We show that the necessary and sufficient condition
for enforcing unp∗-privacy in an RFID system is to equip every tag with the power of
computing a PRF. Our result provides a theoretical foundation to explain why so many
lightweight RFID protocols suffer from privacy vulnerabilities without implementing
necessary cryptographic primitives.
6.1. Unp∗-Privacy =⇒ PRF
Given an RFID system RS with unp∗-privacy, we show that each tag’s computation
function FTi () can be used to construct a PRF family.
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Without loss of generality, let PCH = {0,1}α, PK = {0,1}α1 , PCN = {0,1}α2 , PS =
{0,1}α3 , and PFT = {0,1}α2+α3 , where α, α1, α2 and α3 are four polynomials of κ. For an
index λ ∈ PK × PCN × PS, assume that λ can be uniquely represented by λk‖λcn‖λs (i.e.
|λk| = α1, |λcn| = α2 and |λs| = α3), where λk ∈ PK, λcn ∈ PCH and λs ∈ PS.
Given an RFID system RS = (R, T , ReaderSetup, TagSetup, π ), choose a tag Ti ∈R T
and define a function family G : K ×D −→ R as
Gλ(x) = FTi (λk, λ′cn, λ′s, x),
where
λ ∈ K = PK × PCN × PS,D = PCH and R = PFT ,
λ = λk‖λcn‖λs,
λ′cn‖λ′s = FTi (λk, λcn, λs, x).
We proceed to prove that the function family G : K ×D → R is a PRF family.
THEOREM 5. If the RFID system RS = (R, T , ReaderSetup, TagSetup, π ) is complete,
sound, and unp∗-private, then the constructed function family G : K×D → R is a PRF
family.
PROOF. Since the tag has only limitedmemory to store tag key and/or state information
and since the RFID system RS is complete and sound, the function FTi () cannot be an
empty function (i.e. r 
= ε) and its output cannot be independent of the challenge
messages, or else, one can break the soundness of RS by simply replaying the outputs
of tag Ti. Moreover, the function Gλ(x) defined above is polynomial-time computable
since the protocol π (R, Ti) can be run in polynomial time. Furthermore, it is easy to
index a function of family G by uniformly choosing an index from K. Next, we show
that the function family G is pseudorandom.
Assume that the function family G is not pseudorandom. That is, there exists an
algorithm T which passes the PTPT for Gwith non-negligible advantage. We construct
an algorithm B which runs T as a subroutine and breaks the unp∗-privacy of RS with
non-negligible advantage.
Algorithm B proceeds as follows. It first selects a tag Ti randomly from T and sets
Ti as the challenge tag for the unp∗-privacy experiment. Then, algorithm B invokes
algorithm T . When algorithm T asks queries about Of , B uses its O2 (i.e., InitTag)
oracle to respond. When algorithm T outputs a bit b, algorithm B also outputs the
bit b.
Now, we calculate the advantage of B in the unp∗-privacy experiment, which provides
a perfect simulation for T . The probability that Bmakes a correct guess of the coin toss
of the unp∗-privacy experiment is no less than the success probability of T . Hence, the
advantage of B is non-negligible. Furthermore, it is obvious that the running time of
algorithm B is the same as that of T . This completes the proof.
6.2. Unp∗-Privacy ⇐= PRF
Now, we construct an RFID system with unp∗-privacy by implementing a PRF on each
tag. Let F : {0,1}lk × {0,1}ld → {0,1}lr be a PRF family, ctr ∈ {0,1}lr be a counter, and
pad1 ∈ {0,1}lp1 be a padding such that lr + lp1 = ld. The RFID system is constructed as
follows and the protocol is illustrated in Figure 11.
ReaderSetup(κ). It sets up a reader R with σ = {F, pad1, pad2} according to security
parameter κ.
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Reader R
{(Ii, ki, ctri, IDi)}
Tag Ti
(ki, ctri)
c ∈R{0,1}lc−−−−−−−−−−→
r1 Ii,r2←−−−−−−−−−−
r2 ∈R {0, 1}lp2,
Ii = Fki(ctri pad1),
r1 = Fki(c Ii r2)⊕ ctri.
ctri = ctri + 1.
If find the tuple (Ii, ki, ctri, IDi), then
If ctri = Fki(c Ii r2)⊕ r1, then
update ctri = ctri + 1 and Ii = Fk(ctri pad1),
compute f = Fki(c ctri r2) and accept the tag.
Else f ∈R {0, 1}lr and reject the tag.
Else If ∃(Ii, ki, ctri, IDi) such that
ctri = Fki (c Ii r2) ⊕ r1 and Fki(ctri pad1) = Ii,
then
update ctri = ctri + 1 and Ii = Fki(ctri pad1)
compute f = Fki(c ctri r2) and accept the tag.
Else f ∈R {0, 1}lr and reject the tag.
f−−−−−−−−−−→
If f = Fki(c ctri r2),
accept the reader.
Else,
reject the reader.
Fig. 11. Mutual authentication protocol with Unp∗-privacy.
TagSetup(Ti, κ). It sets up a tag Ti with a key ki ∈ {0,1}lk and a counter ctri = 1. It
also stores a tuple (Ii,ki, ctri, IDi) in the reader’s database, where Ii = Fki (ctri‖pad1)
and IDi is the tag’s identity.
Protocol π (R, Ti). R sends a challenge c ∈R {0,1}lc to Ti. Upon receiving c, Ti executes
the following steps:
(1) Randomly choose r2 ∈ {0,1}lp2 , where lc + lr + lp2 = ld.
(2) Compute Ii = Fki (ctri‖pad1) and r1 = Fki (c‖Ii‖r2) ⊕ ctri.
(3) Respond with (r1‖Ii, r2) and increment ctri by 1.
Upon receiving the response (r1‖Ii, r2),R identifies the tag from its database as follows:
(1) Search for the tuple (Ii,ki, ctr′i, IDi) using Ii as an index. If such a tuple exists,
compute Fki (c‖Ii‖r2) and then
(a) If ctr′i = Fki (c‖Ii‖r2) ⊕ r1, update ctr′i = ctr′i + 1 and Ii = Fki (ctr′i‖pad1), respond
with f = Fki (c‖ctr′i‖r2) and accept the tag.
(b) Else, respond with f ∈R {0,1}lr and reject the tag.
(2) Else look up the database for a tuple (I′i ,ki, ctr
′
i, IDi) in an exhaustive search such
that ctri = Fki (c‖Ii‖r2) ⊕ r1 and Fki (ctri‖pad1) = Ii. Then
(a) If such a tuple exists, update ctr′i = ctri + 1 and I′i = Fki (ctr′i ||pad1), respond
with f = Fki (c‖ctr′i‖r2) and accept the tag.
(b) Else, respond with f ∈R {0,1}lr and reject the tag.
Upon receiving f , Ti checks whether f = Fki (c‖ctri‖r2). If not, Ti rejects the reader;
otherwise, accepts.
Next, we prove that the constructed RFID system is unp∗-private.
THEOREM 6. If the function family F : {0,1}lk ×{0,1}ld → {0,1}lr is a PRF family, then
the RFID system RS = (R, T , ReaderSetup, TagSetup, π ) defined above is unp∗-private.
PROOF. Assume that RS is not unp∗-private. That is, there exists an adversary A
which can (	, t,q, s,u, v)-break the unp∗-privacy of RS. We construct an algorithm B
that can pass the PTPT for the function family F.
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On the input of an oracle Of for a function f = Fk or f ∈R RandD→R, algorithm B
invokes A and simulates the unp∗-privacy experiment for A as follows:
Simulate the learning stage. Initially, B selects an index i between 1 and  randomly
and sets the initial state of the tag Ti as ctri = 1. The key of Ti is implicitly set to be
k, which is unknown to B. For 1 ≤ j ≤  and j 
= i, B selects a random key (index)
kj ∈R {0,1}κ1 , then sets the key and the internal state of the tag T j as kj and ctrj = 1,
respectively.
When adversary A asks queries about O1, O2, O3 and O4, algorithm B uses Of and
the keys k1, . . . ,ki−1,ki+1, . . . ,k to respond. Note that, when A issues O3 query on tag
Ti, B aborts and randomly outputs a bit.
Simulate the challenge stage. A submits an uncorrupted challenge tag Tc. If Tc 
= Ti,
B aborts and randomly outputs a bit.
Simulate the guess stage. Algorithm B answers adversary A’s queries about O1, O2,
O4 using Of and the keys k1, . . . ,ki−1,ki+1, . . . ,k.
Output. Finally, adversary A outputs a bit b′. B also takes b′ as its output.
If B does not abort during the simulation, B’s simulation is perfect and is identically
distributed as the real one from the construction. It is obvious that the probability that
B does not abort during the simulation is 1

. Therefore, the advantage of B is at least 	

.
The running time of B is approximate to that of A. This completes the proof.
6.3. Minimal Requirement on RFID Tags for Unp∗-Privacy
Combining Theorems 5 and 6, one can derive the following:
THEOREM 7. An RFID system RS = (R, T , ReaderSetup, TagSetup, π ) with unp∗-
privacy can be constructed if and only if each tag Ti ∈ T is empowered to compute a
PRF, provided that RS is complete and sound.
This theorem indicates that to ensure unp∗-privacy, the computational power of
tags cannot be weaker than that of computing a PRF. In other words, the minimal
requirement on tags to achieve unp∗-privacy for RFID systems is the ability to compute
a PRF or its equivalents such as symmetric block ciphers and cryptographic hash
functions [Goldreich et al. 1986].
This minimal requirement highlights why many lightweight RFID protocols
[Karthikeyan and Nesterenko 2005; Duc et al. 2006; Chien and Chen 2007; Konidala
et al. 2007] have privacy flaws [Peris-Lopez et al. 2008; van Deursen and Radomirovic
2008], as these protocols are constructed based on simple operations such as XOR, bit
inner product, 16-bit pseudo-randomnumber generator (PRNG), and cyclic redundancy
checksum (CRC) without using any computation equivalent to PRF.
The RFID research community has in recent years realized the importance of imple-
menting strong and yet lightweight cryptographic primitives for low-cost RFID tags
[Eisenbarth et al. 2007] and significant progress has been made in this area. For in-
stance, the efficient hardware implementation for the Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) has 3,400 gate equivalents (GEs) [Feldhofer et al. 2005]. A specially designed
block cipher, PRESENT, can further reduce the hardware requirement to as few as
1,570 GEs with reasonable security (80 bits) and performance [Bogdanov et al. 2007].
For asymmetric cryptography, a minimum 113-bit ECC can be realized in hardware
with a much larger chip area (at least 10,000 GEs) [Kumar and Paar 2006].
We stress that the minimal requirement does not imply that every RFID system
constructed based on PRF or its equivalents is unp-privacy. For example, the RFID
systems given in Ohkubo et al. [2004] and Peris-Lopez et al. [2006] are reported to have
privacy vulnerabilities, though they are constructed based on symmetric encryption
schemes or cryptographic hash functions. How to apply PRF or its equivalents to design
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an efficient and low-cost RFID system with unp-privacy remains an interesting area
for further investigation.
The new protocol we provided in Section 6.2 (also see Figure 11) can be considered
as an example of such design. One advantage of our protocol is that it is most efficient
in identifying a tag in normal situations in which desynchronization does not happen
frequently; it resorts occasionally to exhaustive search to identify a tag that has been
desynchronized, but resumes to exact match of index again after a successful read of
the tag until the next desynchronization attack.
7. CONCLUSION AND OPEN PROBLEM
In this article, we presented the limitations of the existing unpredictability-based RFID
privacy models and proposed a new unpredictability-based privacy model, denoted as
unp-privacy, based on the indistinguishability of a real tag and a virtual tag. We
investigated the relationship between unp-privacy and ind-privacy, which is another
RFID privacy model based on the indistinguishability of two tags. We proved that ind-
privacy is weaker than unp∗-privacy. We further investigated the minimal requirement
on RFID tags for enforcing unp∗-privacy. Our result shows that RFID tags must be
empoweredwith the ability to compute a PRF family or its equivalents so as to construct
a complete and sound RFID systemwith provable unp∗-privacy. This result can be used
to explain why many existing lightweight RFID protocols have privacy flaws.
Our minimal condition reflects the equivalence between the unp∗-privacy and the
PRF family. According to our results, PRF can also be used to construct RFID systems
with ind-privacy. However, the other direction is uncertain. An open problem is to find
the minimal condition for enforcing ind-privacy in RFID systems.
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